Rewriting the events leading to the Battle of Gaugamela

Our history of Alexander the Great is mainly based on what the Greek sources tell us, picked up by later authors like Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch. We have ignored what Persian sources could say because of the difficulty deciphering the often fragmentary texts written on clay tablets from the Babylonian Library or on papyri from the Oxyrhynchus site in Egypt.

Watching a documentary from 2009 of Michael Wood searching for the plain of Gaugamela in war-ridden northern Iraq revived the battle scenario of Alexander against Darius as seen from the Persian point of view, i.e., contemporary to Alexander. Michael Wood had an in-depth conversation with Prof. Irving Finkel of the British Museum, handling several cuneiform tablets.  

These cuneiform clay tablets belong to the Astronomical Diaries kept in the temple of the Babylonian god Marduk. The diaries contain daily observations of the sky and all kinds of information about the current political events, the water level of the Euphrates and Tigris, the food prices, and other various topics, and the meteorological records. Over the past two centuries, millions of these tablets have surfaced from all over Mesopotamia. The majority has not yet been deciphered, leaving us with wide lacunas. Therefore, the work of Prof. Irving Finkle is very commendable. 

With Michael Wood, he concentrated on three lines on these tablets that require careful consideration in the case of Gaugamela. 

That month, the eleventh [corresponds to 18 September 331 BC], panic occurred in the camp before the king. The Macedonians encamped in front of the king [must be Darius at Arbela].

This inscription suggests that the Persian soldiers were demoralized or were reluctant to fight. 

The twenty-fourth [corresponds to 1 October 331 BC], in the morning, the king of the world [meaning Alexander as King of Asia] erected his standard [lacuna]. Opposite each other they fought and a heavy defeat of the troops. The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities [they went] They fled to the land of the Guti [meaning the road to Ecbatana]

These lines shed a very different light on the battle as opposed to what Greek historians wrote about Darius turning his chariot around and leaving his soldiers behind (see: "The troops of the king deserted him"). If the Persian troops left their king, that would be a totally different situation.

Prof. Irving understands that “the king’s men deserted him” means the Persians refused to fight. This may very well involve Mazaeus at Gaugamela, as he was holding the right flank facing Parmenion’s contingent. Was the confrontation on that end of the long Persian front really as fierce as our Greek narratives want us to believe, with Parmenion’s flank crumbling down? Or was it mainly a show to save face vis-à-vis King Darius?

If the soldiers on that flank (the Persian right) were not ready to engage in a fight, Alexander could more easily concentrate on his own right flank. Thus, he executed his whirling move and rode towards Darius through the formed gap. Darius fled from the battlefield, but it transpired that many of his troops had turned back before their king did. 

We may wonder whether, instead of an act of bravery or military genius on Alexander’s part, the battle was won thanks to the bribes of some of Darius’ generals, including Mazaeus (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

On the eleventh [corresponds to 18 October 331 BC], in Sippar [this is just north of Babylon] an order of Alexander to the Babylonians was sent as follows: 'Into your houses I shall not enter.'

Here, the tablets are quoting Alexander verbatim as he confirms that he would not enter the houses of Babylon. In other words, he officially declares that his troops will not plunder the city. This was clearly a pre-arranged gesture. 

The above calls for some further explanation. 

Let’s consider the nearly obvious bribe of Mazaeus. We have to go back to the banks of the Euphrates, where Hephaistion was building two bridges over the Euphrates at its narrowest point near Thapsacus (see: Crossing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers). The Persian general had arrived on the other side and watched Hephaistion’s construction progress for several days. Hephaistion stopped his operation short of the opposite riverbank as he did not want to see the end of his bridges destroyed by Mazaeus. Work was at a stalemate till Alexander appeared with the bulk of his army, and Mazaeus turned around to scorch more earth in front of the enemy’s advance as ordered by Darius. 

Mazaeus had 2,000 Greek mercenaries at his service. They must have been happy to talk to the Macedonians on the opposite bank to exchange the latest news during the stalemate. Robin Lane Fox implies that Mazaeus (who, having been satrap of Cilicia, spoke Greek) at that time could have forged some agreement with Hephaistion in view of the upcoming battle. At first sight, this seems outlandish, but this is very plausible on second thought. Hephaistion was often sent on diplomatic missions by Alexander, and the events on the bank of the Euphrates may well have been one such occasion. While he was waiting, Hephaistion had ample time to consult Alexander, still marching towards him. Such a private agreement would inevitably shed totally new light on the upcoming fight at Gaugamela (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

As soon as Darius left the battlefield, Mazaeus followed suit and rode to Babylon. When Alexander approached the city some three weeks later, he was met by Mazaeus, who surrendered himself and the city. This has been recorded by Curtius and certainly fits into the prearranged agreement! 

Babylon was a well-defended stronghold with a 68 km-long wall that would have been a tough nut to crack had Mazaeus not surrendered it to the new King of Asia (see: Babylon and Alexander’s reorganization of the army). 

In his search for the battlefield location, Michael Wood also talked to Lt General Sir Robert Fry, head of British Forces in Iraq, who was in charge of his security. The general is a historian and fervent admirer of Alexander the Great, with his own views on the military aspect. He says that, in figures, the Battle of Gaugamela was perhaps the biggest in history until Napoleon! It decided the fate of Asia. 

He further adds that - like all great leaders in history - Alexander left no weapon unused – even the gods. Alexander did not make his last sacrifice to Phoebus because he was afraid, but he wished fear and terror on the Persians! True to his generalship, Robert Fry marvels at the logistics of bringing an army of 50,000 to Iraq, 80,000 to Persia, and even more to India. Imagine the long supply line! 

The general also looks at the upcoming battle from Darius’ side and confirms that he has taken all necessary precautions. He had a superior cavalry with heavier horses, had the strength of numbers, and the battle itself was well prepared. The plan of the Persian king was to breach the phalanx in order to break the cohesion of the Macedonian army at its center and then envelop the outnumbered Macedonians. Darius had not expected Alexander to stretch the army to his right and create an opening to ride straight at him. The battle was not about their numbers, the general continued, but it came down to the decisions of two individuals. 

These are fascinating statements and ideas. General Fry ends with words along the line of “Alexander’s idea of defeating the Persians may be his idea of linking the eastern and western empires by trade routes and by an army integrated in ethnic terms. These are extraordinary imaginative ideas! Alexander was a globalist. He would thoroughly understand the world today.” How true that is!

[Pictures 2 and 3 are from Oliver Stone's movie Alexander] 

Crossing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers

River crossings are generally considered mere accessory events in Alexander's campaign, but they are widely underestimated. On their way east, the Macedonians had to cross countless rivers, streams, and rivulets. Each of these, however, came with its own challenges: some were mere sandy flats while others were filled with rocks; some banks were steep and slippery while others were marshy and swampy; some streams were lazy water ribbons while others were torrential white waters; and some were hazardous while others were placid.

Over the years, Alexander crossed many significant rivers, among which the most important are the Danube, the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and finally, the Indus, including the entire Punjab, i.e., the Hydaspes (Jhelum), the Acesines (Chenab), the Hydraotes (Ravi), and the Hyphasis (Beas). This time, let us concentrate on the Euphrates and the Tigris, major barriers to Alexander's march through Mesopotamia.

In mid-July 331 BC, Alexander sent Hephaistion ahead to build two bridges over the Euphrates. Such crossing points were well-known in antiquity, and Alexander's intelligence must have provided the necessary information. The most amazing part of such expeditions is the logistics involved. It is said that Alexander transported his ships in separate elements from Phoenicia to be reassembled on the banks of the Euphrates. Even in a straight line from the eastern Mediterranean, let's say from Antioch-on-the-Orontes (Antakya) to Thapsacus (Carchemish), we are talking about a distance of more than 200 km, implying that he must have planned this colossal move early on, maybe even while he was still at Tyre. As always, his invaluable scouts did a thorough reconnaissance job, for Alexander could not take chances to expose Hephaistion and his advanced forces to enemy attacks on the way. Even more admirable is the timing of the entire operation since the bridges had to be completed by the time Alexander and the bulk of his army arrived. 

Hephaistion's forces included carpenters and engineers who directed the hauling of the ship's parts, but also enough soldiers to do the foraging and to withstand any unexpected attack by local tribes or those people still faithful to the Persians. The crossing point was near Thapsacus, where the river was about 800 meters wide. Unfortunately, the river banks are now flooded by yet another dam further upstream, and archaeologists can't investigate this in any way. 

Meanwhile, King Darius knew that Alexander had to cross the river. He sent his most experienced general, Mazaeus, with instructions to burn the crops ahead of the enemy route. Although the harvest had already taken place, this order was carried out, and little was left to burn. Besides, this policy had no effect since Alexander took a more northerly route, which Darius had not expected.

We know that Mazaeus arrived on the eastern bank of the Euphrates and watched Hephaistion's construction progress for several days. Hephaistion stopped his operation short of the opposite riverbank to avoid seeing the end of his bridges destroyed by Mazaeus. There was little else to do for Mazaeus but to wait, but when Alexander appeared with the bulk of his army, he turned around and left to further execute his orders of scorching the earth.

By now, it must have been mid-August, and soon the two bridges were completed. This means that Hephaistion accomplished his task in a maximum of six weeks' time – speaking of engineering prowess! Of course, these were no bridges in the true sense of the word, but boats and rafts tied together with ropes and chains. A walkway of planks was placed over the boats, and the passage was created to move the nearly 50,000 troops across, as well as the thousands of horses. It seems it took the army five days to cross the Euphrates.

Alexander led his troops further east, and on the road, he learned from spies that Darius was encamped on the Tigris River. As an army is most vulnerable when crossing a river, Alexander force-marched his troops and reached the Tigris two weeks later. Here, he found no sign of Darius and nobody to stop his army. The obvious fording location has been pinned at Abu Dhahir, near the Persian Royal Road.

There was no need to build a floating bridge over the Tigris River since its waters were shallow, although fast-flowing, and men could simply wade through. Well, this is the simple version that most historians like us believe, but Diodorus tells an entirely different story. According to him, Mazaeus had decided that the river could not be crossed at the time because it ran too deep and its current was too swift. Consequently, the Persian general did not find it necessary to guard the crossing. So, when Alexander arrived at the ford, the water was above a man's breast, and the current swept away those who entered the river. At this stage, Alexander ordered all his men to lock arms with each other and "to construct a sort of bridge out of the compact union of their persons."

Yet the most vivid and perilous report is given by Curtius. He mentions that Alexander cautiously sent a few of his cavalry to test the river. The water rose up to their horses' flanks and, when they were mid-channel, to their necks. "Tigris" in Persian means "arrow," and the river owes its name to its current running as fast as an arrow. Alexander ordered his troops in formation with the infantry in the center. The men had to carry their weapons above their heads as they waded through the river with great difficulty. Like in a battle formation, the cavalry was posted on either side, where the horses upstream would break the strong current, and the cavalrymen downstream would catch those soldiers who lost footing and were swept away. Alexander directed the operation like on a battlefield, pointing his troops in this or that direction and encouraging them to move on. They all landed safely without any loss of life, only some material losses.

Once on dry land, Alexander gave his men a well-deserved rest. This was at the time of the moon eclipse that occurred on 20 September, and it has been recorded that Alexander sacrificed to the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth.

[Bottom picture is from World Archaeology]

Tracking Alexander from Tyre to the Euphrates

When reading any of the Alexander histories, the routes he followed seem to be clear-cut and leave no room for any doubt at all – that is until we actually try to walk in his steps with a map in hand. Many stretches are quite obscure while others are, let’s say, not too obvious. Historians have a tendency to stick to the facts and when nothing noteworthy is happening between point A and point Z, they simply skip every step or stop in between. This is the case when Alexander leaves Tyre for Thapsacus and Arrian simply states that he marches “inland”; a straightforward route until you try to figure it out.

In antiquity, the traveler would generally follow rivers, skirt mountains and deserts, look for arable lands able to provide enough food, and spot wells for drinking water when there is no river on the way. When this is not possible, one has to be inventive. A good example of such creativity is, for instance, when Alexander has his fleet accompanying him along the desert of the Sinai; another one when he returns from Egypt to Tyre and where his army had widely depleted the rare agricultural provisions on their way south a few months earlier and he made use of his fleet once again.

From Tyre, scholars are generally torn between two possible routes leading the army inland. The first would retrace Alexander’s steps north to near Antioch-on-the Orontes along the coastline and from there turn east towards the Euphrates as Cyrus the Younger and Crassus had done, using the fleet to support his provisions. The other possible road, which I prefer because the region was more fertile in antiquity, runs east to Damascus and from there north to Homs, Hama, Apamea, and Aleppo. Or, after all, Alexander may have used a combination of both routes – why not?

Damascus is incontestably the oldest inhabited city in the world and against all odds, I am looking for traces of Alexander but find none. That is not surprising since he only passed through the city in 331 BC; there was no siege or resistance apparently. In fact, there is nothing left that could refer to Hellenistic times, as all traces generally have been erased and supplanted by Roman constructions anyway. The Romans, however, used Greek and Aramaic foundations when they laid-out Damascus, covering an area of approximately 1,500 x 750 meters, inside its protective walls. Damascus counted seven city gates, but only the Bab Sharqi on the east side has survived. This city has been discussed in detail in my earlier blog, Damascus after Alexander.

Even the modern road north from Damascus skirts the eastern flanks of the Lebanon Mountains. The countryside looks uninviting and a pretty barren stretch of some 200 kilometers that Alexander must have tackled stubbornly as always, although the land may have been more fertile in his days.

Beyond Homs, he must have aimed for Hama which lies on the Orontes River and is today one of the largest cities in Syria after Aleppo, Damascus and Homs and an obvious stop for anyone traveling between Damascus and Aleppo. Under Hellenistic rule, the city prospered since it laid on the trade routes between Greece and Asia. Hama is best known for its spectacular large wooden waterwheels – a Roman/Byzantine invention so ingenious that you have to see them in order to fully grasp their significance (see: Hama and its ingenious norias). Known under their Arabian name as norias, their earliest traces are found in a mosaic dating from 469 AD but they may have been used earlier on.

From Hama, the modern road heads straight for Aleppo without being hampered by the desert but Alexander must have stayed closer to the floodplains of the fertile Orontes River for the first stretch of his route at least and would, inevitably, have come to Apamea (see: Apamea, heritage of Alexander).

Leaving Apamea, Alexander must have veered to the northeast across a mostly desert landscape to reach Aleppo, almost one hundred kilometers away. It is not impossible that previously to his march, he organized water depots along the way.

The modern city of Aleppo has been built right on top of its antique remains, meaning that there is very little to see from when Alexander was here in 331 BC. His successor, Seleucos called it Beroea in memory of the city by the same name in Macedonia. It became the center of gravity of the Hellenistic colonization till it was conquered as the rest of Syria by Pompey in 64 BC.

The most striking feature in Aleppo is unmistakably its Citadel situated at the center of the old city that was surrounded by a five kilometres-long wall counting seven entrance gates. To my knowledge, no Greek/Hellenistic remains have been uncovered although excavations have reached the layers of the neo-Hittite period. Yet it seems that friezes belonging to a temple dedicated to the god of storm Hadad dating from the third millennium BC have been discovered.

This partially manmade hill that is crowned by the famous Citadel rises some fifty meters above the city and measures respectively 450 and 325 meters across since it has an elliptical shape. Originally the entire hill was covered with large blocks of whitish limestone that were very difficult to climb; some of these slabs are still in situ. The mound is surrounded by a moat, 22 meters deep and 30 meters wide, which has been added in the 12^th century. The inside of the Citadel is a town on its own with a hammam, a number of mosques, a palace occupied by the sons of Saladin and even a theater that is still being used. All this is obviously a very far cry from what Alexander may have found, but the panoramic view over the roofs of Aleppo cannot have been too much different, except for the presence of minarets and mosques.

Alexander arrived at Thapsacus by mid-summer 331 BC and had two (pontoon) bridges constructed over the Euphrates which, according to historians was a good 700 meters wide at this spot. There have been endless discussions about the location of this city, which has been placed at Al Raqqa, Dura-Europos and even at Deir-Ezzor further downstream. Based on the facts related by Xenophon and Eratosthenes, however, all evidence points towards Carchemish on the Turkish-Syrian border. It seems that, except for a few towering walls, there is very little left of old Thapsacus because after the construction of yet another dam the river has turned into a lake and the scant remains are nothing more than an island in the middle of the Euphrates. It is so sad to find such a historical place swallowed by the waters after centuries of survival!

It so happened that my first view of the Euphrates River was near Birecik, Turkey, on the road from Gaziantep to Sanliurfa, i.e. about 30 kilometers north of the place that has been identified as Thapsacus. Crossing this majestic, wide, blue and fast flowing river over a modern bridge, confirmed that I was truly entering Mesopotamia, the land between Euphrates and Tigris from my history books. The depiction of this being the Fertile Crescent eludes me, for the land is desolate and barren and the houses on the eastern river bank are nothing more than square colored blocks piled up against a sandy hill.

Based on Darius’ earlier crossing of the Euphrates before the Battle of Issus, it may have taken Alexander five days to move his entire force to the eastern bank. The logistics of such an operation are never discussed in detail, neither here nor at any other major river like the Nile, the Tigris, the Oxus, the Jaxartes or the Indus for that matter, but the operations much have been colossal and terribly well organized!

The modern flow of the Euphrates cannot be compared to what it was in Alexander’s days, mainly because of the many barrages that interfere, but it remains a very rewarding experience to follow the river further downstream along the Lake of al-Assad to Rasaffa, Al-Raqqa, Halabia, Deir Ezzor and finally to Dura-Europos. These basically were all Roman forts at the edge of the empire but most probably were first settled by Seleucos a few decennia earlier. Contemplating the river from among the reed fields in the near silence on an early winter evening was one of my greatest experiences. In the tiny villages in between, time has come to a standstill.

Another memorable moment was at Halabia where I climbed up to the remains of a Roman fort. From this strategic location, I could look up and down the Euphrates beneath me as the soldiers had done some 2,000 years ago. From this vantage point, I was reminded of Alexander when the occasional car crossed the rickety pontoon bridge with a resonating sound in the quiet evening air. History was simply unfolding at my feet! I was wishfully thinking to look for Thapsacus around there.