Rewriting the events leading to the Battle of Gaugamela

Our history of Alexander the Great is mainly based on what the Greek reporters tell us, picked up by later authors like Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch. We have ignored what Persian sources could say because of the difficulty deciphering the often fragmentary texts written on clay tablets from the Babylonia Library or on papyrus from the Oxyrhynchus site in Egypt.

Watching a documentary from 2009 of Michael Wood searching for the plain of Gaugamela in war-ridden northern Iraq revived the battle scenario of Alexander against Darius as seen from the Persian point of view, i.e., contemporary of Alexander. Michael Wood had an in-depth conversation with Prof. Irving Finkle of the British Museum handling several cuneiform tablets.  

These cuneiform clay tablets belong to the Astronomical Diaries kept in the temple of the Babylonian god Marduk. The diaries contain daily observations of the sky and all kinds of information about the current political events, the water level of the Euphrates and Tigris, the food prices and other various topics, and the meteorological records. Over the past two centuries, millions of these tablets have surfaced from all over Mesopotamia. The majority has not yet been deciphered, leaving us with wide lacunas. Therefore the work of Prof. Irving Finkle is very commendable. 

With Michael Wood, he concentrated on three lines on these tablets that require careful consideration in the case of Gaugamela. 

That month, the eleventh [corresponds to 18 September 331 BC], panic occurred in the camp before the king. The Macedonians encamped in front of the king [must be Darius at Arbela].

This inscription suggests that the Persian soldiers were demoralized or were reluctant to fight. 

The twenty-fourth [corresponds to 1 October 331 BC], in the morning, the king of the world [meaning Alexander as King of Asia] erected his standard [lacuna]. Opposite each other they fought and a heavy defeat of the troops. The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities [they went] They fled to the land of the Guti [meaning the road to Ecbatana]

These lines shed a very different light on the battle as opposed to what Greek historians wrote about Darius turning his chariot around and leaving his soldiers behind (see: "The troops of the king deserted him"). If the Persian troops left their king, that would be a totally different situation.

Prof. Irving understands that “the king’s men deserted him” means, the Persians refused to fight. This may very well involve Mazaeus at Gaugamela, as he was holding the right flank facing Parmenion’s contingent. Was the confrontation on that end of the long Persian front really as fierce as our Greek narratives want us to believe with Parmenion’s flank crumbling down? Or was it mainly a show to save face vis-à-vis King Darius?

If the soldiers on that flank (the Persian right) were not ready to engage in a fight, Alexander could more easily concentrate on his own right flank. Thus executing his whirling move and ride towards Darius through the formed gap. Darius fled from the battlefield, but it transpired that many of his troops had turned back before their king did. 

We may wonder whether, instead of an act of bravery or military genius on Alexander’s part, the battle was won thanks to the bribes of some of Darius’ generals, including Mazaeus (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

On the eleventh [corresponds to 18 October 331 BC], in Sippar [this is just north of Babylon] an order of Alexander to the Babylonians was sent as follows: 'Into your houses I shall not enter.'

Here, the tablets are quoting Alexander verbatim as he confirms that he would not enter the houses of Babylon. In other words, he officially declares that his troops will not plunder the city. This was clearly a pre-arranged gesture. 

The above calls for some further explanation. 

Let’s consider the nearly obvious bribe of Mazaeus. We have to go back to the banks of the Euphrates where Hephaistion was building two bridges over the Euphrates at its narrowest point near Thapsacus (see: Crossing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers). The Persian general had arrived on the other side and watched Hephaistion’s construction progress for several days. Hephaistion stopped his operation short of the opposite river bank as he did not want to see the end of his bridges destroyed by Mazaeus. Work was at a stalemate till Alexander appeared with the bulk of his army, and Mazaeus turned around to scorch more earth in front of the enemy’s advance as ordered by Darius. 

Mazaeus had 2,000 Greek mercenaries at his services. They must have been happy to talk to the Macedonians on the opposite bank to exchange the latest news during the stalemate. Robin Lane Fox implies that Mazaeus (who, having been satrap of Cilicia, did speak Greek) at that time could have forged some agreement with Hephaistion in view of the upcoming battle. At first sight, this seems outlandish, but this is very plausible on second thought. Hephaistion was often sent on diplomatic missions by Alexander, and the events on the bank of the Euphrates may well have been one such occasion. While he was waiting, Hephaistion had ample time to consult Alexander, still marching towards him. Such a private agreement would inevitably shed totally new light on the upcoming fight at Gaugamela (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

As soon as Darius left the battlefield, Mazaeus followed suit and rode to Babylon. When Alexander approached the city some three weeks later, he was met by Mazaeus, who surrendered himself and the city. This has been recorded by Curtius and certainly fits into the prearranged agreement! 

Babylon was a well-defended stronghold with a 68 km-long wall that would have been a tough nut to crack had Mazaeus not surrendered it to the new King of Asia (see: Babylon and Alexander’s reorganization of the army). 

In his search for the battlefield location, Michael Wood also talked to Lt General Sir Robert Fry, head of British Forces in Iraq, who was in charge of his security. The general is a historian and fervent admirer of Alexander the Great with his own views on the military aspect. He says that, in figures, the Battle of Gaugamela was perhaps the biggest in history until Napoleon! It decided the fate of Asia. 

He further adds that - like all great leaders in history - Alexander left no weapon unused – even the gods. Alexander did not make his last sacrifice to Phoebus because he was afraid, but he wished fear and terror on the Persians! True to his generalship, Robert Fry marvels at the logistics of bringing an army of 50,000 to Iraq, 80,000 to Persia, and even more to India. Imagine the long supply line! 

The general also looks at the upcoming battle from Darius’ side and confirms that he has taken all necessary precautions. He had a superior cavalry with heavier horses, had the strength of numbers, and the battle itself was well prepared. The plan of the Persian king was to breach the phalanx in order to break the cohesion of the Macedonian army at its center and then envelop the outnumbered Macedonians. Darius had not expected Alexander to stretch the army to his right and create an opening to ride straight at him. The battle was not about their numbers, the general continued, but it came down to the decisions of two individuals. 

These are fascinating statements and ideas. General Fry ends with words along the line of “Alexander’s idea of defeating the Persians may be his idea of linking the eastern and western empires by trade routes and by an army integrated in ethnic terms. These are extraordinary imaginative ideas! Alexander was a globalist. He would thoroughly understand the world today.” How true that is!

[Pictures 2 and 3 are from Oliver Stones' movie Alexander] 

Babylon and Alexander’s reorganization of the army

Most ancient authors do not spend much time in Babylon. After Alexander’s triumphal march into the city and his appointment of Mazaeus as governor, they quickly move on to Susa, his next stop.

Well, it seems they moved a little too quickly for after all Alexander spent exactly 34 days in Babylon and that time was certainly not spent sitting idle. The only ancient writer giving us more details is, as usual, Curtius.

[Charles LeBrun, Alexander's arrival in Babylon, The Louvre] 

For a start, he mentions that upon arrival, Alexander is met by Mazaeus, the foremost Persian general at the recent Battle of Gaugamela, who surrenders himself and the city. Babylon was a well-defended stronghold with a 68 km-long wall and would have been a tough nut to crack had Mazaeus, not presented it to the new King of Asia.

Alexander entered Babylon in a chariot surrounded by his armed men, many people went out to see him. Among them was Bagophanes, guardian of the citadel and of the royal treasury. He went as far as to strewing the entire road with flowers. On both sides of the Procession Way, he had placed silver altars loaded with frankincense and all kinds of perfumes. He did not come empty handed either, leading herds of horses and cattle, while lions and leopards were brought before Alexander as well. This procession was followed by the chanting Magi and the Chaldeans singing and playing musical instruments. The cortege was closed by the Babylonian cavalry looking their smartest. The townspeople were allowed to join the march-past at the very end, after the infantry.

Curtius admires the beauty and antiquity of the city, which he shares with Alexander and whoever lays eyes on it. He gives us a pretty detailed description of Babylon, stating that its walls were built of small baked bricks that were cemented with bitumen – a substance the Macedonians were to discover for the first time. These walls stood 22 meters high and were 10 meters wide and it is said that two four-horse chariots riding on top could pass each other. The wall towers were even three meters taller than the wall itself. No construction leaned against the inside of the city wall and none of the buildings were continuous, leaving an open spaces that could be cultivated – a very handy asset in case of a siege.

The fact, however, that the River Euphrates flew right through Babylon did not seem to create any security concern to the Babylonians. Remarkably, they built a stone bridge over the river in order to connect both sides – not a small achievement considering the inconstant flow of the river and its alluvial deposits.

The Citadel is another impressive feature of Babylon. Curtius mentions that it was 25 meters high (the foundations ran ten meters deep) and that it was surrounded by a nearly four-kilometer-long circuit. The famous Hanging Gardens are, according to this author, to be found at the top of this citadel, just peeping over the top of the city walls, although they generally are seen as being part of the Royal Palace. The entire story of these Hanging Gardens, apparently built by Nebuchadnezzar for his homesick wife, is shrouded in mystery. In spite of being labeled as one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, it remains one of the unsolved enigmas that I will not develop here.

We know that Alexander settled in the comforts of the Royal Palace, receiving ambassadors and delegates from all over his empire and catching up with his many administrative duties. The newly appointed Mazaeus as governor of Babylon (the first “oriental” to receive this honor) was assisted by two military commanders of Alexander’s choice, Apollodorus of Amphipolis and Menes of Pella. He also designated Agathon of Pydna to guard the Citadel. From the freshly acquired treasury, Alexander distributed a bonus to his cavalry and infantry as well as to all the mercenaries in his service.

His army had been very much welcomed by the Babylonians with plenty of food and wine and … women. Curtius brings this generosity to another level by stating that fathers and husbands allowed their daughters and wives to prostitute themselves to the liberators provided that a fair price was paid in return. The women who took part in these drinking parties are said to have peeled off one layer of clothing after the next to “gradually disgrace their modesty”. It seems that prostitution was regarded as a courtesy. Whatever the extent of these feasts, the debauchery had to be stopped and the best remedy was for Alexander to march his men to their next destination, Susa, another Persian capital.

While on the road, reinforcements sent earlier by Antipater joined Alexander’s ranks. They were Macedonian and Thracian cavalry and infantry as well as mercenaries both on foot and horse from the Peloponnese. With these troops, there also was a group of 50 young adult sons of Macedonian chiefs to serve as bodyguards to Alexander. We know that their function ended after four years of service and the timing for this replacement is entirely coherent since the present bodyguards presumably had started off with Alexander in 334 BC. Curtius is kind enough to give us the job description of these boys as follows: they should wait upon the king at the table, bring him horses during the battle, attend him during the hunting parties, and keep watch at the entrance to his bedroom. If they applied themselves they could be promoted to the level of general in his army.

These fresh recruits, however, had to be merged with the existing seasoned troops, a task Alexander never took lightly. He decided to halt about halfway between Babylon and Susa to make the arrangements and started by closely scrutinizing the reports of good or brave conduct of individuals and making sure they were rewarded accordingly. He arranged for many commanders to be promoted to an even higher post of command. By doing so, he managed to bind his men by strong ties of affection and leading, in the end, to a higher degree of effectiveness.

Meanwhile and in order to keep his men occupied, Alexander organized a contest in military valor overseen by judges he had appointed to this effect. There was much at stake as the bravest competitor would win the command over a troop of 1,000 men, the chiliarchae – the first time this number was used. Under eager attention and wide attendance, eight such Chiliarchs were nominated and they formed a new unit in Alexander’s army. This was also the time when Alexander appointed commanders over units that did not necessarily consist of men from their own region as had been the case under Philip and which Alexander had implemented until now. Another novelty was to replace the trumpet signal that sounded when the camp had to be moved. In the commotion more often than not it seems that the trumpet was not heard and it was therefore decided to place a pole on top of the general’s tent for all to see. The signal consisted of a fire visible by night and smoke during the day.

One may conclude that Alexander took his role as King of Asia very seriously but the reorganization of his army here in Babylon is very telling for the conquests that still laid ahead. He partially canceled the proven and tested rules put in place by his father and replaced them with several innovative features in order to be more efficient and more effective. 

He truly was a general in heart and soul who did not shy away from adapting his army to new situations and circumstances of which there were many more to follow in the years ahead.

[Except for the first and last photographs, all others are borrowed from Oliver Stone's movie Alexander]

"The troops of the king deserted him"

These are the words that appear on a clay tablet written by a contemporary eyewitness in Babylon after the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC.

[Picture from Livius site]

This cuneiform clay tablet belongs to the Astronomical Diary that was kept in the temple of the Babylonian god Marduk. These diaries contain not only daily observations of the sky but also all kinds of information about the current political events, the level of the Euphrates and Tigris, the food prices, and other various news, as well as the meteorological records. Over the past two centuries, millions of these tablets have surfaced from all over Mesopotamia, and the majority have not yet been deciphered, leaving us with wide lacunas.

Yet, with bits and pieces, we are able to extract useful information from these tables, like, for instance, the exact date of Alexander’s death on 11 June 323 BC.

In the frame of the Battle of Gaugamela, these inscriptions suggest that the Persian soldiers were demoralized and that “the troops of the king deserted him”. These lines shed a very different light on the battle as recorded by Greek historians who wrote that Darius left his soldiers. It makes us wonder whether, instead of an act of bravery or military genius on Alexander’s part, the battle was won thanks to the bribes of some of Darius’ generals, including Mazaeus (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela).

Due to the complexity of the battle, the vastness of the plain, and the heavy dust that whirled around, nobody could actually have a consistent view of the maneuvers and clashes. Yet at the end of the day, the Macedonians were masters of the field. Callisthenes, a nephew of Aristotle who had been appointed by Alexander to keep his official diary, could hardly have actually seen any part of the battle. He, too, had to rely on the accounts given by the Macedonians at that time. Although later historians like Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, and even Plutarch had access to his records, we have no way to verify what and how he originally told the events since his books are lost to us.

The cuneiform tablet, which started this post, is in the hands of the British Museum and has been closely studied by specialists. For me, there are three lines that are important in the frame of the decisive battle of Gaugamela, which I reproduce hereafter in my own simplified version:

That month, the eleventh [corresponding to 18 September 331 BC], panic occurred in the camp before the king. The Macedonians encamped in front of the king [must be Darius at Arbela].

The twenty-fourth [corresponding to 1 October 331 BC], in the morning, the king of the world [meaning Alexander as King of Asia] erected his standard [lacuna]. Opposite each other they fought and a heavy defeat of the troops. The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities [they went] They fled to the land of the Guti.[meaning the road to Ecbatana]

On the eleventh [corresponding to 18 October 331 BC], in Sippar [this is just north of Babylon] an order of Alexander to the Babylonians was sent as follows: 'Into your houses I shall not enter.'

For the complete text and pertaining comments, please refer to the site of Livius at this link and/or this link.

Based on the above, the least we can say is that we know only part of history and certainly only a tiny portion of what really happened that day of the battle on the dusty plain of Gaugamela.

Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela

The Battle of Gaugamela is generally seen as an overall victory for Alexander and that is what has been recorded in history. Yet, there are two factors or rather personages that call for some serious afterthoughts.

The first is about King Darius III who turned his chariot around and left the scene before the battle was over. In the thick swirling cloud of dust and heavy fighting, it makes me wonder how soon Alexander noticed Darius’ retreat. There may have been a sudden opening in the Persian lines when the Ten Thousand Immortals and Darius’ personal retinue pulled out to escort their king in their sworn duty to protect him. In any case, Darius was the whole reason for the battle to take place and Alexander was not going to give up at this stage. He cannot have been aware of the overall situation on the battlefield as every soldier simply fought the enemy that appeared in front of him in the obscuring dust, but the Macedonians were well drilled and extremely disciplined. They knew what Alexander expected of them and performed to excellence as against all odds, they were able to keep their overall frontline intact – amazing when you consider they were outnumbered six to one.

As soon as he knew that Darius had left the battlefield, Alexander dashed in his pursuit with about 2,000 cavalry. Some claim that he abandoned his army for the sole scope of capturing Darius, but his generals had their instructions and would further fulfill their duty without hesitation. Alexander knew that he could rely on them as he also knew that he needed to capture Darius if he ever wanted to be King of Asia.

Alexander’s pursuit was not without danger or obstacles. Let’s not forget that he was not alone heading in the general direction of Babylon. In fact, he had to thrust through the cloud of dust created by the masses of Persian cavalry on the run who, still faithful to their king tried to stop Alexander and his men. The ensuing fighting was particularly savage and it is known that at least sixty of Alexander’s companions were wounded, including Hephaistion. By the time Alexander shook off the enemy cavalry, Darius had gained a decent head start and had crossed the Great Zab River where he exchanged his chariot for a horse. He soon reached the Royal Road near Arbela, one of the main intersections in the Persian road system. By the time Alexander passed the Great Zab River darkness started to fall and it was obvious that he couldn’t catch up with Darius that day. He decided to get some rest and allow the horses a well-deserved breather.

By midnight he was in the saddle again and reached Arbela in the early morning hours. Here he learned that Darius had taken a sizeable head start, taking a shortcut through the hills. His trail led through the Kurdish mountains with 3,000 meter-high passes where Alexander would be in unchartered terrain and prey to a hostile enemy. He was realistic enough to know that he had to give up his chase. It is clear that he was very disappointed but at the same time, he realized that his first priority now was to take possession of Babylon. The capture of Darius had to wait.

The second case is about Mazaeus, the commander of Darius’ cavalry who fought on his right wing opposite Parmenion.

Records of the Battle of Gaugamela are obviously concentrating on Alexander and only scattered information transpires about what happened on his left wing, except the tale that Parmenion sent a message to Alexander for extra support. This message is a very questionable one and even in antiquity authors do not agree on the details. What is fact and what is fiction? Besides, it seems near impossible to anyone to find Alexander in the commotion and heavy dust bowl on the battlefield. But that is another subject of discussion.

Yet, we do have a contemporary version of the facts recorded in the so-called Babylonian astronomical diaries. One of those cuneiform tablets has been deciphered at the British Museum in London and although it is damaged the text contains the omens and foretells the outcome of the battle. (The full text of these clay tablets has been reproduced in detail on Livius’ site together with a more scholarly report also on this Livius’ site.) Through the fragments, it transpires that some high-ranking officers, including Mazaeus, deserted Darius with a number of men from Battle of Gaugamela. The text says that “the troops of the king deserted him” which could mean that these Persians either joined Alexander and fought on his side, or that they simply refused to fight. This theory of troops deserting King Darius raises speculations that Alexander possibly bribed his Persian enemy – a process that was not at all uncommon in antiquity. Maybe the scheme had been planned on the banks of the Euphrates three months earlier?

When Hephaistion was building his two bridges over the Euphrates, Mazaeus observed the works from the opposite side of the river. Both men faced each other for several days as Hephaistion did not risk finishing his bridges fearing that Mazaeus would immediately destroy them. This game of cat and mouse ended when Alexander in person appeared with the bulk of his troops. At this point, Mazaeus and his 2,000 Greek mercenaries turned around and proceeded to scorch more earth in front of the enemy’s advance as ordered by Darius. It is pure speculation but not impossible that Hephaistion and Mazaeus exchanged messages (Mazaeus having been satrap of Cilicia did speak Greek) while troops on both sides (all Greeks) shouted back and forth over the water.

The fact remains that as soon as Mazaeus saw Darius riding away from the battlefield at Gaugamela, he hurried to Babylon. When Alexander arrived there some three weeks later, he was welcomed in appropriate style by Mazaeus and other Persian noblemen.

In the end, I guess we’ll never know the entire story, neither about Darius’ reason to flee nor about the role played by Mazaeus who, let’s not forget, was Alexander’s first Persian to be appointed as governor in one of his conquered cities.

Interestingly, among the clay tablets, there is another fragment that seems to be a part of Alexander’s address to the people of Babylon, in which he reassures them that he will not “go into their houses”. This corresponds to known Greek sources mentioning that the Macedonians were not allowed to loot Babylon when they entered the city after their victory at Gaugamela.

[Pictures from Oliver Stone's movie Alexander]

Crossing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers

River crossings are generally considered mere accessory events in Alexander's campaign, but they are widely underestimated. On their way east, the Macedonians had to cross countless rivers, streams, and rivulets. Each of these, however, came with its own challenges: some were mere sandy flats while others were filled with rocks; some banks were steep and slippery while others were marshy and swampy; some streams were lazy water ribbons while others were torrential white waters; and some were hazardous while others were placid.

Over the years, Alexander crossed many significant rivers, among which the most important are the Danube, the Nile, the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and finally, the Indus, including the entire Punjab, i.e., the Hydaspes (Jhelum), the Acesines (Chenab), the Hydraotes (Ravi), and the Hyphasis (Beas). This time, let us concentrate on the Euphrates and the Tigris, major barriers to Alexander's march through Mesopotamia.

In mid-July 331 BC, Alexander sent Hephaistion ahead to build two bridges over the Euphrates. Such crossing points were well-known in antiquity, and Alexander's intelligence must have provided the necessary information. The most amazing part of such expeditions is the logistics involved. It is said that Alexander transported his ships in separate elements from Phoenicia to be reassembled on the banks of the Euphrates. Even in a straight line from the eastern Mediterranean, let's say from Antioch-on-the-Orontes (Antakya) to Thapsacus (Carchemish), we are talking about a distance of more than 200 km, implying that he must have planned this colossal move early on, maybe even while he was still at Tyre. As always, his invaluable scouts did a thorough reconnaissance job, for Alexander could not take chances to expose Hephaistion and his advanced forces to enemy attacks on the way. Even more admirable is the timing of the entire operation since the bridges had to be completed by the time Alexander and the bulk of his army arrived. 

Hephaistion's forces included carpenters and engineers who directed the hauling of the ship's parts, but also enough soldiers to do the foraging and to withstand any unexpected attack by local tribes or those people still faithful to the Persians. The crossing point was near Thapsacus, where the river was about 800 meters wide. Unfortunately, the river banks are now flooded by yet another dam further upstream, and archaeologists can't investigate this in any way. 

Meanwhile, King Darius knew that Alexander had to cross the river. He sent his most experienced general, Mazaeus, with instructions to burn the crops ahead of the enemy route. Although the harvest had already taken place, this order was carried out, and little was left to burn. Besides, this policy had no effect since Alexander took a more northerly route which Darius had not expected.

We know that Mazaeus arrived on the eastern bank of the Euphrates and watched Hephaistion's construction progress for several days. Hephaistion stopped his operation short of the opposite river bank to avoid seeing the end of his bridges destroyed by Mazaeus. There was little else to do for Mazaeus but to wait, but when Alexander appeared with the bulk of his army, he turned around and left to further execute his orders of scorching the earth.

By now, it must have been mid-August, and soon the two bridges were completed. This means that Hephaistion accomplished his task in a maximum of six weeks times – speaking of engineering prowess! Of course, these were no bridges in the true sense of the word but boats and rafts tied together with ropes and chains. A walkway of planks was placed over the boats, and the passage was created to move the nearly 50,000 troops across, as well as the thousands of horses. It seems it took the army five days to cross the Euphrates.

Alexander led his troops further east, and on the road, he learned from spies that Darius was encamped on the Tigris River. As an army is most vulnerable when crossing a river, Alexander force-marched his troops and reached the Tigris two weeks later. Here he found no sign of Darius and nobody to stop his army. The obvious fording location has been pinned at Abu Dhahir, near the Persian Royal Road.

There was no need to build a floating bridge over the Tigris River since its waters were shallow, although fast-flowing and men could simply wade through. Well, this is the simple version that most historians like us to believe, but Diodorus tells an entirely different story. According to him, Mazaeus had decided that the river could not be crossed at the time because it ran too deep and its current was too swift. Consequently, the Persian general did not find it necessary to guard the crossing. So, when Alexander arrived at the ford, the water was above a man's breast, and the current swept away those who entered the river. At this stage, Alexander ordered all his men to lock arms with each other and "to construct a sort of bridge out of the compact union of their persons."

Yet the most vivid and perilous report is given by Curtius. He mentions that Alexander cautiously sent a few of his cavalry to test the river. The water rose up to their horses' flanks and when they were mid-channel to their necks. "Tigris" in Persian means "arrow," and the river owes its name to its current running as fast as an arrow. Alexander ordered his troops in formation with the infantry in the center. The men had to carry their weapons above their heads as they waded through the river with great difficulty. Like in a battle formation, the cavalry was posted on either side where the horses upstream would break the strong current, and the cavalrymen downstream would catch those soldiers who lost footage and were swept away. Alexander directed the operation like on a battlefield, pointing his troops in this or that direction and encouraging them to move on. They all landed safely without any loss of life, only some material losses.

Once one dry land, Alexander gave his men a well-deserved rest. This was at the time of the moon eclipse that occurred on 20 September, and it has been recorded that Alexander sacrificed to the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth.

[Bottom picture is from World Archaeology]

The Battle of Gaugamela

The Battle of Gaugamela is Alexander’s best-known battle, and some have even labeled it his biggest battle since it was a turning point in his conquest of the Persian Empire.

After the inconclusive confrontation with Darius at Issus, both kings knew that another battle was inevitable to establish their supremacy. There was too much at stake, for the King of Persia was not ready to give up his throne. Alexander was most determined to make Persia pay for their repeated invasions and destructions of Greece and for occupying the Greek cities in Asia Minor. As we know, Alexander was in no hurry and made sure to safeguard his rear by taking possession of the coastal cities and territories of the eastern Mediterranean first. After being recognized as Pharaoh in Egypt, he marched back through Syria, ready to meet his opponent in Persia.

Alexander was in Harran (today in southern Turkey) when his scouts reported that the massive Persian army was marching north from Babylon. Allowing his army a few days rest, Alexander then ordered a forced march of 350 km to the Tigris as he aimed to reach the river before any enemy force would stop him from crossing, as he was told by the Persian scouts he had captured.

Darius had had two years to prepare for this decisive battle and may have learned from his mistakes (or, shall we say, misjudgments) at Issus. The King of Kings chose his battlefield with great care and took a position in the vast plain on the eastern bank of the Tigris River, above the Boumelus River (modern Khazir), a tributary of the Great Zab, called Gaugamela. His total force has often been over-estimated, but it is generally accepted that he had about 35,000 cavalry and 250,000 infantry, as well as two hundred Scythian chariots. The Persian forces were six times larger than Alexander’s, and these sheer numbers alone must have caused our conqueror some headaches.

The news of Gaugamela reached Alexander before crossing the Tigris at Abu Dahir (nearly 80 km north of modern Mosul), from where he could follow the Persian Royal Road toward the battlefield. On the fourth day of his Easterly march, some stragglers informed him of the precise position of the Persian army some 25 km away. He decided to allow his troops a four-day rest and to prepare them for further action while he would reconnoiter the layout of the battlefield. Once this was accomplished, he moved his army to a base camp, and the following night he took his fighting forces across the intervening hills, where he rested his men. So far, there had not been any visual contact since a ridge of high ground separated both armies. Only after passing this last ridge Alexander had the first view of his opponent stationed about four miles away. He immediately sent for his staff and commanders to discuss the action plan. They agreed that a careful inspection of the terrain was imperative, and with a group of Companions, Alexander spent a whole day on valuable reconnaissance. Meanwhile, his 47,000 troops were to stay where they were. By the evening, the king summoned and briefed his senior officers again as he had decided to proceed with the attack the following day.

Alexander’s address to his soldiers was quite different from his constant encouragements at Issus, for here, everyone knew how important a victory over the King of Persia was from the onset. Nevertheless, he stressed that every soldier should preserve his discipline in the hour of danger, that all orders must be obeyed promptly, and that all officers, whatever their rank, were to pass their commands to their subordinates without hesitation or delay. Most importantly, Alexander stressed that the conduct of each of his men was crucial to the fate of all. In other words, if everyone did his duty as expected, their success was assured, but if only one man neglected it, the entire army would be in peril. Strong talk! If this is not a pure example of leadership, I don’t know.

Just like at Issus, Alexander ordered his troops to rest and eat; the men had time to discuss their commander’s words and mentally prepare for the upcoming battle. The Macedonians, at least, got more rest than the Persians, who, fearing a night attack, were in a constant state of alert.

For once, we know the exact date on which the battle took place thanks to the recorded eclipse of the moon on September 20 at 9 pm, predicting disaster for the Persian army and good omens for Alexander. The actual fight took place eleven days later, on October 1, 331 BC, and by dawn, Alexander appeared at the head of his men wearing his shining ceremonial armor – ready as he ever could be!

On this vast plain, which had been cleared by the Persians of any obstacle that might hinder their chariots and cavalry, the enemy must have felt pretty confident. Darius had placed his strongest forces on his left wing, the one that would be facing Alexander’s right. These were the best horsemen to be found, the Bactrians and Scythians, with in front of them half of the scythe chariots; 50 more chariots were posted near the Royal Squadron of Darius’ cavalry and another 50 in front of his right wing. Darius took up his position at the center of his line, flanked by his Greek mercenaries, followed by individual cavalry units. Darius’ right was put under the orders of Mazaeus, his most capable general who would be facing Parmenion and his troops.

Alexander, as usual, commanded his right wing with his Cavalry Companions, linked by the 3,000 Shields Bearers to the 10,000-strong phalanx that occupied the center. In front of the cavalry, Alexander had posted his archers, slingers, and javelin throwers, who were his long-range weapons. The Thessalian cavalry was posted on the left under the command of Parmenion. The disposition seems to be the same as the one displayed at Issus, with these exceptions that Alexander added on both flanks a series of block formations, a mixture of heavy cavalry and light infantry in a downward line from his main front and making a near junction with his reserve line of some 20,000 mercenary infantry in the rear posted in parallel with his main forces. It obviously shows that Alexander was well-aware that he would be outflanked by the more numerous Persian troops but at the same time, he was also ready to meet an attack from any direction.

Once his forces were in place, Alexander rode up and down his frontline to lift every man's and every squadron's spirits with a last word of encouragement. Everything depended indeed on the commitment of each and every one of Alexander’s troops to maintain the line and avoid any gap in the formation that could be exploited by the Persians.

With the Persian army strung out far beyond that of Alexander, he immediately started to advance obliquely, leading his Companions forward. Still, as he came closer, he suddenly turned the entire force to the right in a sideways movement. He knew that by doing so, he would expose Parmenion to a more serious encirclement threat, but at the same time, he also knew that if he pressed on beyond the end of the Persian left, the enemy most probably would follow his momentum. Consequently, the Persians would eventually leave a gap in their line, which was precisely what Alexander aimed for. 

Darius quickly responded to Alexander’s move by ordering his horsemen to start a flanking maneuver to envelop Alexander and his right wing. The operation seemed successful, but as Alexander stopped his spurt, the Scythian and Bactrian horsemen fighting for Darius rushing straight for Alexander were attacked by his concealed troops, his mercenary cavalry, his infantry flank guards, and several thousands of his veteran mercenaries hidden among them. As the rest of the Persians' left rushed to support the Scythians, the chariots were also commanded forward (while Alexander was still within the leveled ground). Still, these were made useless by a joined action of the javelin throwers and archers. All these movements on the Persian left had created the effect Alexander expected, an opening towards Darius’ chariot at the center.

It makes you wonder how amidst this commotion and heavy dust clouds, Alexander could still order his Companion Cavalry into their customary wedge formation, leading his foot brigades to the offensive against the Persian center. At this point, the Shield Bearers rushed forward, followed on the double by the massive phalanx, probing their sarissas into the enemy lines. Alexander now plunged forward and threw a spear at the Great King (see also: Breathtaking, Alexander the Great at Gaugamela). He missed but killed his charioteer instead. It is probably at this moment that Darius turned his chariot around and fled, closely followed by his Immortals and somewhat shaken Royal guards.

Parmenion, from his end, must have fought a nearly impossible battle in order to keep his squadrons from being encircled and/or dislodged by the Persians under the capable command of Mazaeus. He was outflanked only by a charge of some 3,000 enemy cavalry who rushed through to the Macedonian baggage camp where Queen Mother Sisygambis and her grandchildren were still held in Alexander’s custody. It is unclear whether she refused to accompany her rescuers or if they simply didn’t reach her, as the attackers had not reckoned with Alexander’s line of mercenary reserves that made short work of the enemy forces.

Parmenion being pinned down and hopelessly outflanked left an inevitable gap on the left of the phalanx. A few units of Persian cavalry took their chances and broke the Macedonian line of defense. Their success was short-lived, as the disciplined phalanx soon pushed the Persians back.

Although the battle was not over, the news of Darius’ flight traveled quickly through his ranks and must have demoralized his troops. In the end, it is not clear whether Alexander’s supremacy won the battle or if the Persians lost their drive as their commander-in-chief had fled. With bits and pieces, the Persian army turned its back to the battlefield, and even Mazaeus felt he could not desert his king.

Amazingly and against all odds, Alexander had been able to maintain his line of defense. His men had not let him down!

The details of this battle are very complex. Nobody, not even Alexander, could have a comprehensive overview of how the fight unfolded, and the historical accounts tell only a very partial story. The battlefield was too vast and dusty to make sense of what was going on beyond anyone’s immediate space. The main conclusion is that the battle was won, but with Darius on the run, Alexander could not yet claim his crown as King of Persia.

[Pictures from Oliver Stone's movie Alexander, except the picture of Harran, which is mine]