Alexander vs. Parmenion

A good subject for debate, which I’m afraid cannot be settled to everyone’s satisfaction. Too many opinions from too many authors, too many interpretations by the old historians, and too many options to choose from. That is basically my conclusion. That is if you can call that a conclusion.

[picture from the movie by Oliver Stone]

Parmenion was a Paeonian chieftain who, during one of the campaigns led by King Philip II of Macedon, decided to rally to the side of Macedonia. A clever choice from his side, no doubt, and the result was even better as he turned out to be a faithful brother in arms to Philip. On many occasions, he acted in Philip’s name, like when he went to Athens with Antipater and Eurylochus to repeat his king’s terms for the Common Peace in 346 BC. Six years later, when Alexander was elected Regent while Philip besieged Perinthus, Parmenion, and Antipater remained in Pella to keep an eye on things. He was the one who ended the Fourth Sacred War, taking Amphissa within three hours. During the Battle of Chaeronea, the same veteran general was probably assisting Alexander’s cavalry upon Philip’s instructions.

All along his many fights, sieges, and diplomatic meetings, Philip essentially moved with Parmenion at his side. Yet at the same time, Philip formed a clique with his senior generals, Parmenion, Antipater, and Attalus, from which Alexander was excluded as they were bound together by several intermarriages (much to Alexander’s dismay, as one may imagine, and maybe a reason why he held on to his own group of Companions created during the days at Mieza).

Soon after Philip’s death, Attalus is executed to silence a possible claim to the Macedonian throne (his adopted niece had recently married Philip). When Alexander starts his march to Asia, he leaves Antipater behind as Regent while Parmenion joins his forces.

At this point, it is worth considering the extent of Parmenion’s power and influence over the army – a largely neglected viewpoint.

Parmenion was a man from the “old” stock, Philip’s foremost general and, let’s not forget, the one who played a highly pivotal role as commander of Alexander’s left wing in his battles at the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. What has transpired from ancient authors is that Parmenion disagrees with Alexander’s decisions or plans on several occasions (there may have been more). No other veteran general has been recorded saying that much. We all will remember Alexander’s words: … yes, I would, if I were Parmenion... The fact that Alexander acted upon his own initiative, brushing Parmenion’s advice aside and coming out victorious from the many confrontations, cannot have gone down smoothly.

Steven English, in his “The Sieges of Alexander the Great,”  draws the picture of an all-powerful Parmenion, a seasoned fighter with thorough experience. Besides that, the key positions in the army were occupied by his relatives: sons, allies, kindred, friends, etc. It is entirely possible that he saw himself as the successor of Philip. In his eyes, the young and inexperienced Alexander was not a true competitor. Big mistake, of course. He probably didn’t expect Alexander to win all his battles as he did, and maybe he even hoped that the young king would soon be killed – in which case, he was well prepared with his own trusted network of men.

Jona Lendering (see Livius site) is even blunter as he declares that Philotas (Parmenion’s son accused of conspiracy) confessed under the force of torture that he and his father had wanted to kill Alexander to rule themselves. I don’t know where he found that statement, but it is a plausible assumption.

Robin Lane Fox (“Alexander the Great”), in turn, paints a picture where Parmenion constitutes a severe threat to Alexander. The worrying situation occurs in 330 BC at Ecbatana, where the general controls his king’s supply line with Macedonia while Alexander is fighting in Bactria. Parmenion, already in his seventies, keeps ignoring Alexander’s orders for three months to come to Gurgan. The fact by itself is strange enough, but just consider that on the one hand, Parmenion is sitting on the enormous Persian treasury collected in Susa and Persepolis, which Alexander centralized at Ecbatana, and on the other hand, he has an army of 25,000 men strong at his disposal: Thracians, veteran-mercenaries, Thessalian and Paeonian cavalry, plus another 6,000 men Foot Companions who protected the very money transport. Alexander, at that time, had “only” 30,000 soldiers with him, i.e., approximately the same amount of manpower. In any case, these figures alone are enough to give the King severe headaches and many a sleepless night, no doubt.

Pierre Briant, in his book “Alexander the Great and his Empire,” has a totally different view, stating that Alexander committed a brutal act when he sent a commando to explicitly murder Parmenion in Ecbatana. He doubts that Philotas is guilty of conspiracy, so it is evident that he disagrees with Parmenion’s execution. Briant feels that from 330 BC, Alexander no longer wanted to tolerate Parmenion’s meddling as his vision of his new world had changed (becoming more Persian).

In any case, the accusations and the trial of Philotas were handled the Macedonian way, where every man had his say. Philotas eventually was condemned to death. Under Macedonian law, relatives were equally responsible for the crimes committed by any family member. This implied his father, Parmenion, who occupied a crucial position in Ecbatana and was empowered by the Persian treasury, a large army force. Alexander applied the Macedonian law, which his generals and soldiers could understand. Still, he may have seized this convenient opportunity to eliminate a possible threat to his person and his crown.

Personally, I am convinced that in 330 BC, Alexander had become a different person from the young king who came to power at age twenty. The years of heavy fighting and sieges, long marches through hostile lands and deserts, river crossings, logistical problems, rivalry, and jealousy among his officers, and conspiracies, while he was constantly alert about the moves of his Persian opponent (only in 330 BC King Darius III was captured more dead than alive), etc. were enough elements to change any man. In the process, he became the Great King of a vast empire that had functioned for eons according to its own rules and principles. Aware of these differences and oppositions, we owe it to Alexander’s genius that he makes considerable efforts to comply with the customs of both East and West.

All along the historical accounts, we read how the soldiers from the old Macedonian guard still breathe by the rules of their homeland. These are men who fought with King Philip (and Parmenion) and who became great at his side, men worthy of the great battlefields like those of Chaeronea and Gaugamela. We like to see an army that carries Alexander on its hands. They do, yet only to a certain degree, i.e., as long as their king follows the known old, proven Macedonian traditions. But once in Bactria and Sogdiana, everything changes. There are no great battles to be fought, only heavy skirmishes, surprise attacks, and guerrilla wars. The men grow tired – no wonder. Inevitably conflicts arise. His soldiers, even his generals, can’t understand how the newly conquered enemy suddenly has to be accepted as friendly mates filling the ranks of their dead comrades. Yet it is clear that Alexander needed to replace those thousands of men left behind on the battlefields, in the newly founded towns, in the strongholds and forts along the way, in the heat of the deserts or in the waters of the many rivers, the wounded men, the invalids, the veterans. The logistics of Alexander’s campaign in Asia are simply beyond anyone’s comprehension, even today – so how much could be asked from the simple Macedonian soldier?

Some authors like to throw in the ideal image of Alexander aiming at melting east and west together to create an impossible dream world. I believe there were limits, even to his ambition. I’m sure Alexander found the world much bigger and far more different than he could ever have imagined. He was very well aware that life in Asia evolved according to rules and values away from those he grew up with. Yet he was a visionary, and his visions ran far ahead of his time. Nobody could understand the complex amplitude of his world, I think, nobody except maybe Hephaistion.

Even today, we still struggle to understand …