Rewriting the events leading to the battle of Gaugamela

Our history about Alexander the Great is mainly based on what the Greek reporters tell us, picked up by later authors like Arrian, Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch. We have ignored what Persian sources could say because of the difficulty deciphering the often fragmentary texts written on clay tablets from the Babylonia Library or on papyrus from the Oxyrhynchus site in Egypt.

Watching a documentary from 2009 of Michael Wood searching for the plain of Gaugamela in war-ridden northern Iraq revived the battle scenario of Alexander against Darius as seen from the Persian point of view, i.e., contemporary of Alexander. Michael Wood had an in-depth conversation with Prof. Irving Finkle of the British Museum handling several cuneiform tablets.  

These cuneiform clay tablets belong to the Astronomical Diaries kept in the temple of the Babylonian god Marduk. The diaries contain daily observations of the sky and all kinds of information about the current political events, the water level of the Euphrates and Tigris, the food prices and other various topics, and the meteorological records. Over the past two centuries, millions of these tablets have surfaced from all over Mesopotamia. The majority has not yet been deciphered, leaving us with wide lacunas. Therefore the work of Prof. Irving Finkle is very commendable. 

With Michael Wood, he concentrated on three lines on these tablets that require careful consideration in the case of Gaugamela. 

That month, the eleventh [corresponds to 18 September 331 BC], panic occurred in the camp before the king. The Macedonians encamped in front of the king [must be Darius at Arbela].

This inscription suggests that the Persian soldiers were demoralized or were reluctant to fight. 

The twenty-fourth [corresponds to 1 October 331 BC], in the morning, the king of the world [meaning Alexander as King of Asia] erected his standard [lacuna]. Opposite each other they fought and a heavy defeat of the troops. The king, his troops deserted him and to their cities [they went] They fled to the land of the Guti [meaning the road to Ecbatana]

These lines shed a very different light on the battle as opposed to what Greek historians wrote about Darius turning his chariot around and leaving his soldiers behind (see: "The troops of the king deserted him"). If the Persian troops left their king, that is a totally different situation.

Prof. Irving understands that “the king’s men deserted him” means, the Persians refused to fight. This may very well involve Mazaeus at Gaugamela, as he was holding the right flank facing Parmenion’s contingent. Was the confrontation on that end of the long Persian front really as fierce as our Greek narratives want us to believe with Parmenion’s flank crumbling down? Or was it mainly a show to save face vis-à-vis King Darius?

If the soldiers on that flank (the Persian right) were not ready to engage in a fight, Alexander could more easily concentrate on his own right flank. Thus executing his whirling move and ride towards Darius through the formed gap. Darius fled from the battlefield, but it transpired that many of his troops had turned back before their king did. 

We may wonder whether, instead of an act of bravery or military genius on Alexander’s part, the battle was won thanks to the bribes of some of Darius’ generals, including Mazaeus (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

On the eleventh [corresponds to 18 October 331 BC], in Sippar [this is just north of Babylon] an order of Alexander to the Babylonians was sent as follows: 'Into your houses I shall not enter.'

Here, the tablets are quoting Alexander verbatim as he confirms that he would not enter the houses of Babylon. In other words, he officially declares that his troops will not plunder the city. This was clearly a pre-arranged gesture. 

The above calls for some further explanation. 

Let’s consider the almost obvious bribe of Mazaeus. We have to go back to the banks of the Euphrates where Hephaistion was building two bridges over the Euphrates at its narrowest point near Thapsacus (see: Crossing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers). The Persian general had arrived on the other side and watched Hephaistion’s construction progress for several days. Hephaistion stopped his operation short of the opposite river bank as he did not want to see the end of his bridges destroyed by Mazaeus. Work was at a stalemate till Alexander appeared with the bulk of his army, and Mazaeus turned around to scorch more earth in front of the enemy’s advance as ordered by Darius. 

Mazaeus had 2,000 Greek mercenaries at his services. They must have been happy to talk to the Macedonians on the opposite bank to exchange the latest news during the stalemate. Robin Lane Fox implies that Mazaeus (who, having been satrap of Cilicia, did speak Greek) at that time could have forged some agreement with Hephaistion in view of the upcoming battle. At first sight, this seems outlandish, but this is very plausible on second thought. Hephaistion was often sent on diplomatic missions by Alexander, and the events on the bank of the Euphrates may well have been one such occasion. While he was waiting, Hephaistion had ample time to consult Alexander, still marching towards him. Such a private agreement would inevitably shed totally new light on the upcoming fight at Gaugamela (see: Two key afterthoughts on Gaugamela). 

As soon as Darius left the battlefield, Mazaeus followed suit and rode to Babylon. When Alexander approached the city some three weeks later, he was met by Mazaeus, who surrendered himself and the city. This has been recorded by Curtius and certainly fits into the prearranged agreement! 

Babylon was a well-defended stronghold with a 68 km-long wall that would have been a tough nut to crack had Mazaeus not surrendered it to the new King of Asia (see: Babylon and Alexander’s reorganization of the army). 

In his search for the battlefield location, Michael Wood also talked to Lt General Sir Robert Fry, head of British Forces in Iraq, who was in charge of his security. The general is a historian and fervent admirer of Alexander the Great with his own views on the military aspect. He says that, in figures, the Battle of Gaugamela was perhaps the biggest in history until Napoleon! It decided the fate of Asia. 

He further adds that - like all great leaders in history - Alexander left no weapon unused – even the gods. Alexander did not make his last sacrifice to Phoebus because he was afraid, but he wished fear and terror on the Persians! True to his generalship, Robert Fry marvels at the logistics to bring an army of 50,000 to Iraq, 80,000 into Persia, and even more to India. Imagine the long supply line! 

The general also looks at the upcoming battle from Darius’ side and confirms that he had taken all necessary precautions. He had a superior cavalry with heavier horses, had the strength of numbers, and the battle itself was well prepared. The plan of the Persian king was to breach the phalanx in order to break the cohesion of the Macedonian army at its center and then envelop the outnumbered Macedonians. Darius had not expected Alexander to stretch the army to his right and create an opening to ride straight at him. The battle was not about their numbers, the general continued, but it came down to the decisions of two individuals. 

These are fascinating statements and ideas. General Fry ends with words along the line of “Alexander’s idea of defeating the Persians may be his idea of linking the eastern and western empires by trade routes and by an army integrated in ethnic terms. These are extraordinary imaginative ideas! Alexander was a globalist. He would thoroughly understand the world today.” How true that is!

[Pictures 2 and 3 are from Oliver Stones' movie Alexander]